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Abstract 
We draw on data from a national RDD telephone sample of 1549 adult Americans 
conducted between October 15, 2001 and March 2, 2002 to explore the impact of a need for 
security on support for national security policies in the aftermath of the 911 terrorist attacks. In 
past research, an external threat has been assumed to have uniform impact on an affected 
population, a claim that has met with growing research scrutiny. We advance research on threat 
through an examination of the political effects of individual differences in one’s ability to feel 
secure in the aftermath of terrorism, exploring the interaction between perceived threat and felt 
security. Most Americans reported a sense of security after the 911 attacks. But a sense of 
insecurity among a minority of Americans coupled with a perceived threat of future terrorism 
increased support for both domestic and international security policy-- the curtailment of 
domestic civil liberties, tougher visa checks, and support for the war in Afghanistan. Our 
findings underscore the diverse ways in which individuals react politically to a common external 
threat. We draw on attachment (Bowlby 1982/1969) and terror management theory (Pyzszcynski 
et al 2002) to understand the origins of individual differences in felt security.  
 
Psychological reactions to terrorism play a pivotal role in understanding public support for 
government anti-terrorist policies. As Crenshaw (1986, p. 400) argues: “The political 
effectiveness of terrorism is importantly determined by the psychological effects of violence on 
audiences.” There are differing psychological reactions to external threat, however, and these 
reactions shape support of government policies designed to combat terrorism. In our past 
research we have explored the differing political implications of anxiety, anger, perceived 
personal threat, and perceived national threat (Huddy et al 1995; Huddy, Feldman and Cassese in 
print; Huddy et al 2003). In the current study, we take this research one step further to explore 
not only political reactions to threat but how a sense of security interacts with threat to influence 
support for national security policies.  
Terrorists aim to threaten members of a target population directly by perpetrating random 
acts of violence on people engaged in everyday activities. Research on threats that involve the 
potential for physical harm such as crime, natural disasters, and violent conflicts provide clear 
evidence that personal threat increases one’s sense of vulnerability and motivates action designed 
to minimize personal risk (Browne and Hoyt 2000; Ferraro 1996; Sattler et al 2000; Smith and 
Uchida 1988). We find similar evidence after 9/11. Individuals living in Queens and Long Island 
(in relatively close proximity to the World Trade Center) who felt personally threatened by 
terrorism used more caution in handling their mail, spent more time with their families, delayed 
or dropped their plans to travel by air, and used public transportation in Manhattan less 
frequently in the several months after the attacks. In this instance, perceived personal threat 
motivated cautionary action over and above the effects of any perceived risk of terrorism to 
Americans more generally (Huddy et al 2002).   
Threat not only motivates protective behaviors, it also promotes support for protective 
government policies. Studies conducted to date find a clear relationship between national threat 
and support for national and domestic security policies (Davis and Silver 2004; Huddy et al 
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2005). In our research on reactions to 9/11, we find that perceived future terrorist threat leads to 
greater support for an aggressive national security policy, including increased support for the war 
in Afghanistan (Huddy et al 2005). Threat also heightens support for increased surveillance 
policies against current and potential Arab immigrants to the United States, and policies that 
promise increased domestic safety but threaten Americans’ civil liberties. National threat leads to 
support for punitive action against terrorist groups (Bar-Tal and Labin, 2001, Gordon and Arian 
2001; Friedland and Merari 1985). And an adversary’s degree of belligerence and the level of 
threat posed to US interests increase public support for war and military action against a specific 
aggressor (Herrmann et al. 1999; Jentleson 1992; Jentleson and Britton 1998; Mueller 1973). 
Threat clearly increases support for aggressive foreign policy but it is less clear whether this 
serves a retaliatory function or is seen as a form of protection.  
We further explore the link between threat and support of national security policy by 
examining the extent to which it depends on a person’s sense of personal security. Some 
individuals are able to maintain a sense of security even in the face of threatening events that 
may undercut their need for protective personal and government policies (Pszczyinski et al 2002; 
Mikulincer and Shaver 2003; Fraley, Fazzari, Bonanno, & Dekel, 2006.).  
 
A Need for Security: Attachment and Terror Management Theories 
There is broad agreement among social scientists that a sense of security is a basic need in 
humans and other species (Fraley 2005; Goldberg 2000; Mikulincer and Shaver 2003). 
Psychologist Abraham Maslow (1943) placed security just above the satisfaction of basic 
physiological needs in his hierarchy of human needs (and below love and self-actualization).  
And political scientist Ronald Inglehart (1997), building on Maslow’s work,  viewed the 
fulfillment of basic economic and security needs as a necessary societal precondition to the 
pursuit of postmaterialist values which emphasize freedom, self-expression and quality of life. 
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Bowlby’s attachment theory (1982/69) is an evolutionary-developmental account of social 
behavior that posits a need for social proximity to protective others under conditions of threat 
and danger, implicitly assuming a need to maintain a sense of security under threat.  
Building on Bowlby’s original insights (1969) on the universality of a human need for 
attachment as way to deal with insecurity, scholars have theorized about the evolutionary 
advantage of adult attachment under conditions of threat (Ainsworth, Blehar, Water, and Well, 
1978; Mikulincer and Shaver, 2003; Fraley, Brumbaugh, and Marks, 2005; Kirkpatrick, 1998; 
Tancredy and Fraley, 2006). Several different possibilities have been raised. First, adult 
attachment could improve human reproductive fitness through the process of kin selection by 
promoting the protection of those with whom one shares similar genes (Hamilton, 1964). 
Second, adult attachment could be a simple outgrowth of humans’ protracted developmental 
period in infancy in which attachment is needed to protect offspring and stimulate complex 
social and cognitive skills (Bowlby, 1969; Fernald, 1993; Mikulincer and Shaver, 2003; Fraley, 
2002). Third, adult attachment may foster long-lasting romantic and parenting relationships 
which may improve the fitness of one’s offspring (Zeifman and Hazan, 1997; although for 
alternative views see Belsky, 1999; Chisholm, 1996; Buss and Schmitt, 1996; Schmitt, 2005; cf., 
Kirkpatrick, 1998).  
As noted by Sroufe and Waters (1977), the goal of attachment behaviors is to reduce 
anxiety through an established sense of “felt security”. The attachment system emerges in early 
infancy, particularly in the context of the caregiver-child relationship, and operates as a 
functional system organizing interpersonal beliefs throughout development (Bowlby, 1969). 
While the attachment system is universal, operating in all humans and a host of other organisms 
(e.g., Fraley et al., 2005), individual differences often emerge from variations in attachment 
histories.  Successful early attachment experiences establish one’s chronic attachment style, 
operating as what Bowlby (1969) referred to as an “internal working model” of the self and other 
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(Bartholomew and Horowitz, 1991). Repeated episodes of successful attachment behavior give 
rise to a secure attachment style, which is marked by self-confidence, empathy, and trust in both 
children and adults (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003; Brennan & Shaver, 1995; Mikulincer & Shaver, 
2001). We are primarily concerned with the difference between secure and insecure attachments 
in this research, but numerous researchers have investigated the consequences of differing types 
of insecure attachment styles.  
Once established, attachment styles are relatively constant across the lifespan, suggesting 
that they serve as a stable individual difference (Fraley, 2002; Ainsworth, 1991) that may be 
mediated by distinct neural and hormonal reactions to threat. For instance, Kraemer (1992) found 
that physiological indicators of stress such as norepinephrine varied depending on whether 
rhesus monkeys were reared in isolation versus with mothers or peers. And humans with an 
enduring sense of insecurity release higher levels of glucocorticoids in stressful situations than 
those with a secure attachment (Goldberg, 2000). 
A good deal of research on attachment theory has been devoted to the assessment of 
individual differences in attachment style, and the effects of this style on ongoing romantic 
relationships. But the theory is broader than that, and has been employed to understand 
individual differences in coping with stressful events. Typically, researchers examine the impact 
of attachment style on coping with various threats (for a review, see Mikulincer and Shaver 
2003). Some of that research is very relevant to the study of reactions to terrorism. Mikulincer 
and colleagues (Mikulincer, Florian and Weller 1993) examined the effects of the Gulf War, and 
Iraqi Scud missile attacks, on Israelis with different attachment styles and found that securely 
attached individuals perceived lower levels of threat, reported higher levels of self-efficacy, 
actively sought out social support, and pursued constructive problem solving strategies.  Former 
Israeli prisoners of war with a secure attachment style reported that they recalled positive 
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memories or encounters with others to help cope with their imprisonment, in essence seeking 
symbolic proximity to internalized attachment figures (Solomon et al 1998). The need for 
attachment can also be activated by a mortality salience manipulation typically employed in the 
study of terror management theory (Mikulincer, Birnbaum, Woodis, and Nachamis 2000). 
Secure individuals tend to react to mortality salience with an increased desire for intimacy 
(Mikulincer and Florian 2000) and greater willingness to engage in social interaction (Taubman 
Ben-Ari, Findler, and Mikulincer 2002). In contrast, less secure individuals respond to mortality 
salience with more severe judgment and punishment of transgressors (Mikulincer and Florian 
2000).  
When taken together, research on attachment theory suggests that a long-standing sense 
of security derived from a secure attachment style and associated active coping strategies may 
help to mitigate the negative effects of stressful events. The ability to cope well with stressful 
events may extend to politics, undermining the need among secure individuals for government 
policies designed to promote a sense of safety. This possibility has not yet received empirical 
support but offers an intriguing explanation of how long-standing dispositions interact with 
events to shape support for government security policies. As a consequence, the theory may help 
to explain why threat is likely to drive one person to demand more powerful safety and security 
policies from the federal government while another is able to maintain a sense of personal 
security in the absence of government action.  
In a popular competing view of how humans maintain a sense of ongoing security, terror 
management theory (Pyszczinski et al 2002) provides a related but distinct account of how 
individuals restore a sense of security in the face of threat, especially existential threats linked to 
one’s morality. Form this perspective, coping involves adherence to a cultural worldview linked, 
for example, to religion, moral conduct, or patriotism that boosts self–esteem and often involves 
the derogation of outsiders who do not share the same view. Terror management researchers 
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have paid less attention to differences in the ways in which individuals restore a sense of security 
but recent research by Hart and colleagues (2005) suggests that differences in attachment style 
also moderate responses to existential threats. In their research, insecure individuals were most 
likely to respond to existential sthreat with more positive ratings of an ingroup member.  
In this research, we closely examine whether a sense of felt security provides a buffer 
against threatening events and reduces the need for government action to maintain a sense of 
safety. We focus on both domestic and international government security policies. In essence, we 
test whether perceived threat coupled with a feeling of insecurity promotes support for policies 
that enhance domestic security but may reduce civil liberties, and leads to increased support for 
overseas military action.  
Anxiety: A Needed Control 
In turning to security as an important moderating influence on perceived threat, it is 
important to distinguish its effects from that of anxiety with which it is related. Our past work 
demonstrates that personal threat is strongly tied to a sense of heightened anxiety. Individuals 
who felt anxious after 9/11 experienced higher levels of personal threat and were more likely to 
live in New York city and have known someone who was killed or injured in the attacks (Huddy 
et al 2005).  This highlights a key facet of anxiety. It is in part situational and affected by 
ongoing events as made clear by much research on state anxiety (Eysenck 1992). But this stands 
in marked contrast to a sense of security which, unlike anxiety, is grounded in a  long-standing 
sense of personal safety and is unlikely to be affected by a specific stressful event. Anxiety is a 
product of a stressful event whereas a sense of security mitigates negative psychological 
reactions to such an event (Mikulincer and Shaver 2003). 
Research on attachment theory makes clear that anxiety and a secure attachment style are 
negatively related. A secure attachment predicts better mental health under stressful 
circumstances, and decreased symptoms of depression and anxiety (Fraley et al, 2006). A sense 
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of felt security is likely to dampen anxious reactions to the events of 9/11 and so be negatively 
related to it, but we expect the relationship to be modest because other situational factors such as 
proximity to the events or the severity of their personal impact also shape a sense of personal 
threat and concomitant levels of anxiety.  
We also expect anxiety and security to have differing effects on domestic and national 
security policies. Recent psychological research demonstrates that threat-induced anxiety tends 
to elevate risk perceptions and risk aversion (Lerner and Keltner 2000; 2001; Lowenstein et al 
2000; Raghunathan and Pham 1999).  The link between anxiety and risk aversion has important 
implications for support of national but not domestic security policies. Anxiety is likely to 
elevate the perceived risks associated with a given military intervention and decrease support for 
the deployment of military troops, potentially undercutting a desire for retaliation. But it is 
unlikely to undercut support for domestic security policies which are not inherently risky. We 
have confirmed these predictions in our prior research on reactions to 9/11  and the Iraq war 
(Huddy et al 2005; Huddy, Feldman, and Cassese 2005). In contrast, both domestic and 
international security policies should provide a sense of security to threatened individuals who 
lack a strong sense of internal safety.   
Hypotheses 
We supplement past findings from research on terrorism with recent psychological 
insights from attachment and terror-management theories on the importance of felt security in 
dealing with stressful events. We focus specifically on the degree to which the political effects of 
threat depend on a sense of insecurity. We contrast the origins of felt security with other 
reactions to the 911 terrorist attacks, and expect security to be a more long-standing reaction than 
anxiety and depression that is less tied to perceived threat and the personal consequences of the 
attacks. Consistent with the predictions of attachment theory, we also expect felt security to 
moderate the influence of threat on anxiety, and produce a greater sense of trust in fellow 
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Americans. We examine whether a sense of security moderates the desire to bolster self-esteem 
through an increase in American patriotism and denigration of outsiders, consistent with the 
expectations of a blended attachment-terror management approach.  
Finally, we evaluate whether felt security moderates the influence of threat on support of 
national security policy. Felt security should decrease the influence of perceived terrorist threat 
on support for domestic security policies. It should also decrease the impact of threat on support 
for overseas military action. In contrast, insecure individuals who perceive pervasive threat 
should be most inclined to support both domestic and international security policy.  
Methods 
Sample 
Our data are drawn from a national telephone survey conducted with a panel of 
respondents at three different time points. The first wave of the national survey was conducted 
between early October, 2001 and early March, 2002 and includes interviews with 1,549 
randomly selected adults aged 18 or older. A sample of Random Digit Dial (RDD) telephone 
numbers was generated by Genesys Inc. from telephone blocks with at least one listed residential 
number (one-plus). Respondents were selected randomly within the household using the last-
birthday method (Lavrakas 1993). The sample was drawn as a weekly rolling cross-section with 
roughly 100 individuals interviewed each week throughout this period. Numbers from each 
randomly selected sample were in use for a two-week period. The first month of data was 
collected by Shulman, Ronca, and Bukuvalis; the remainder of the data (including waves 2 and 
3) was collected by the Stony Brook University Center for Survey Research. Up to 15 callbacks 
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were made at each number and an attempt made to convert individuals who initially refused. The 
overall response rate was 32% (AAPOR RR3) and the cooperation rate was 52% (COOP3).1 
The second wave of data collection occurred in October of 2002 at the end of 
Congressional debate on the war. Of the original interviewees, 858 were re-interviewed for a re-
interview rate of 55% roughly 7 to 12 months after the original interview. An additional 221 
respondents were added to the panel from a fresh RDD sample drawn to the same specifications 
as the original one. This new component was designed to serve as a check on panel effects, 
attrition, and composition. The response rate was 39% (RR3) and the cooperation rate was 56% 
(COOP3). The third wave occurred between March and June of 2003. All three survey waves 
were roughly 20 minutes in length.  
Our analysis focuses entirely on data from the first wave of data collection. The first 
wave included questions on perceptions of threat, emotional reactions and somatic symptoms 
linked to 9/11, support for the Bush administration, military intervention in Afghanistan, policies 
aimed at tightening internal security, perceptions of Arab and Arab-Americans, and patriotism, 
in addition to standard political and demographic items.  
Results 
Threat and Security 
 We begin by examining the perceived threat of terrorism in the aftermath of the attacks of 
9/11. The survey included four items designed to measure the perceived threat of terrorism 
which are presented in Table 1.  Levels of national threat were quite high. Over 85% of 
Americans reported that they were very or somewhat concerned about another attack and 84% 
were very or somewhat concerned about the threat of biological or chemical attacks. Levels of 
personal threat were lower, although still surprisingly high given the very small percentage of the 
                                                     
1 There was no difference in response rate between the two survey organizations and response rates were similar to 
those obtained in recent RDD surveys using a different sampling frame but similar methodology (Steeh, Kirgis, 
Cannon, and DeWitt 2001; Losch et al. 2002). 
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population killed in the attacks. More than two-thirds (68%) of respondents reported being very 
or somewhat concerned about being personally affected by a terrorist attack; 31% were very 
concerned. Over half (52%) said that the attacks had shaken their sense of personal safety and 
security a great deal or some. This latter item appears to tap security, but in reality is more 
closely aligned with perceived personal and national threat. These four items are highly inter-
correlated with a mean correlation of just under .5 (r = .48) and a simple additive scale has an 
estimated reliability (coefficient alpha) of .79. The perceived threat scale ranges from 0 to 1 and 
has a mean of .66 and standard deviation of .24. 
**INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE ** 
 It is clear from these responses that Americans saw considerable future terrorist threat to the 
nation in the months after 9/11. Despite this, level of felt security were high. The majority of 
respondents reported feeling secure and confident when asked to “think about the terrorist 
attacks and the U.S. response”. About 45% of respondents said they felt secure and confident 
“very often,” a little over a third said they felt this way “sometimes,” and only 16% said “not 
very often” or “never.” Thus, even when asked about their feelings in the context of the 9/11 
attacks, Americans reported high levels of felt security. The two security items were highly 
correlated (r=.53) and were combined into a scale ranging from 0 to 1 (high security) with a 
mean of .74.  
 As noted earlier, security is expected to be distinct from other emotional reactions to the 
attacks such as anxiety. The two security items were asked in the same battery as four anxiety 
questions. Respondents were again asked “As you think about the terrorist attacks and the U.S. 
response, how often have you felt” anxious, scared, worried, and frightened. These four 
responses were highly correlated (mean r = .59) and combined into a scale with an estimated 
reliability of .85. A confirmatory factor analysis of all six emotional reactions (anxiety and 
security) indicates that a two factor solution is a much better fit to the data than a single factor 
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model. With the inclusion of a methods factor to account for the common response alternatives, 
the estimated correlation for the latent anxiety and security factors is -.35. It is thus clear that the 
anxiety and security measures are negatively related but are also empirically distinct.  
 As can be seen in Figure 1, security and anxiety also have noticeably different distributions 
in this sample. Consistent with previous research on secure attachments, a large fraction of the 
respondents score at the upper end of the security measure. Typically, roughly 75% of adults 
have a secure attachment style when assessed with a standard measure based on questions about 
romantic relationships (Hazan and Shaver 1987).  The mean of the felt security scale in this 
study is .75 and the median is .83, indicating that feeling secure is the modal response among 
respondents. While the mass of the data are close to the high end of the scale there is a definite 
lower tail to the distribution that extends to the low end of the scale (3.5% of the respondents 
obtained a value of 0). In contrast, anxiety is distributed in a less concentrated fashion with a 
mean of .39 and a median of .33. High scores on anxiety are much more common in these data 
than low scores on security as can be seen in Figure 1.  
**INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE ** 
Determinants of Anxiety, Depression, and Security  
 The nature of security can be seen more clearly when we examine its predictors along with 
the determinants of anxiety and reported symptoms of depression. To measure feelings of 
depression, respondents were asked “In the past week, how depressed have you felt, if at all, 
about the terrorist attacks and the events since then?” with response options ranging from very to 
not at all. Similar questions were asked about how much difficulty they had concentrating on 
their job, and trouble sleeping. Responses to these questions had a mean inter-item correlation of 
.58 and were combined into an additive scale ranging from 0 to 1. We estimated two models to 
assess the respective determinants of anxiety, feelings of depression, and felt security. The first 
model includes demographic variables (age, education, gender, race/ethnicity), political variables 
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(partisan and ideological identification and authoritarianism), and physical and emotional 
proximity to the 9/11 attacks (living in the Northeast and knowing someone hurt or killed in the 
attacks). Perceived threat was added to these equations in a second set of models. Estimates of 
these regression equations are shown in Table 2.  
**INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE ** 
 At the outset, we expected anxiety and depression to be closely linked to different aspects of 
the terrorist attacks, but did not hold the same expectations of felt security because of its 
theoretical status as a more enduring and stable individual difference. This expectation is largely 
supported in Table 2. Physical proximity to the September 11 attacks, as indicated by living in 
the Northeast of the U.S., had a significant effect on both anxiety and depression. Knowing 
someone who was killed in the attacks also increased levels of both variables.2 In contrast, 
physical and emotional proximity to the attacks did not decrease feelings of personal security. 
Indeed, there were few other significant predictors of security. Most notably, women reported 
feeing less secure than men, older people felt more secure than younger respondents, and blacks 
felt slightly less secure than whites. Political beliefs and allegiances also influenced anxiety and 
depression. Republicans felt less anxious and depressed, and authoritarians felt more so. But 
once again the determinants of felt security differ which was unrelated to partisanship, political 
ideology, or authoritarianism.   
 The relative stability of feelings of security is also suggested by the results of a second set of 
estimates obtained by adding perceived threat to each of the basic models in Table 2. As seen in 
this table, threat has large effects on anxiety and symptoms of depression. Anxiety in particular 
rises rapidly with increases in perceived threat. While the effect of threat is significant in the 
security equation, it is small compared to its coefficients in the other two equations. The effect of 
                                                     
2 The exact question wording is “Do you, any of your friends, or relatives know someone who is missing, hurt, or 
killed in the terrorist attacks of September 11?  
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threat on security is less that a fourth the size of its effect on anxiety (coefficients can be simply 
compared because each variable is measured on a 0-1 scale). Thus while anxiety and depression 
were strongly related to the threat of terrorism, those same threat perceptions only slightly 
dampened feelings of security.   
 In general, there is much less variation in security across social and political variables than is 
seen for anxiety or depression and it has no obvious relationship to variables that convey the 
impact of physical or social proximity to the attacks and its victims. Overall, threat and 
demographic factors accounted for 6% of the variance in felt security compared to 26% of the 
variance in depressions and an impressive 42% of variance in anxiety. When taken together, 
these findings provide indirect evidence that feelings of security may be a long standing reaction 
that is relatively unaffected by ongoing events or standard political attitudes and beliefs, although 
we do not have conclusive evidence on this point. 
Interpersonal and Emotional Consequences of Security 
 According to attachment theory, one of the key correlates of a secure attachment is a general 
willingness to trust other people. In order to determine whether our simple measure of felt 
psychological security produces higher levels of trust in other people we estimated two probit 
models for questions in our survey that involve trust in other Americans.3 The estimates of these 
equations are shown in Table 3. In both cases an increased sense of security is related to a trust in 
Americans and a view of them as helpful. In both equations the estimates imply that as security 
varies from low to high the probability of trusting other people increases by about .2 (all other 
predictors held constant at their mean) or a fifth of the scale  range. Trust in people also increases 
somewhat with increasing age and education; blacks are less trusting of other Americans and 
                                                     
3 The two questions are: Generally speaking, would you say that most Americans can be trusted, or do you believe 
that you can't be too careful in dealing with other people? And Would you say that most of the time Americans try to 
be helpful, or that they are just looking out for themselves? 
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view them as less helpful than do whites. Finally, women, Hispanics, and authoritarians are less 
trusting of other Americans than men, Anglos, and non-authoritarians respectively.  
**INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE ** 
 According to attachment theory, one of the key functions of a secure attachment is to 
promote active coping that helps to deal with stress and mitigate its negative psychological 
consequences. Thus, among people who perceive themselves to be personally at threat from 
terrorism, feeling secure should result in lower levels of psychological distress than among the 
insecure. To test the buffering hypothesis, we estimated a regression model for anxiety and 
depression that included perceived threat, security, and their interaction along with other 
standard demographic predictors. As shown in Table 4 there is a sizable coefficient for both 
threat and its interaction with security. With threat and security both ranging from 0 to 1, the 
coefficient for security indicates its effect when security is at its minimum. The impact is clearly 
large. Among the least secure, perceived threat produces considerable anxiety and depression. 
There is also a  significant interaction between threat and security. The impact of threat among 
the most secure can be calculated by adding the coefficient for threat to that of the interaction. 
This indicates that the psychological impact of threat is reduced substantially among the most 
secure. In fact, it is almost halved for depression. These findings lend support to the notion that 
security minimized the psychological impact of the 911 terrorist attacks.  
  **INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE ** 
 According to a blended terror-management attachment theory approach, threat should 
produce heightened ingroup attachments and increased outgroup derogation among insecure 
individuals as another way in which to restore their sense of security (Hart et al 2005). We 
examine the extent to which threat, security, and their interaction influence levels of symbolic 
patriotism and negative stereotyping of Arabs in regression equations presented in Table 5. In 
this analysis, symbolic patriotism is a scale made up of two items: pride in being American and 
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good feelings in response to the flag (r=.61). Arab stereotyping is assessed with four items 
asking how well the words trustworthy, honest, violent and extremist described most Arabs 
(mean r=.36, alpha=. 7).  
As seen in Table 5, the coefficient for threat and its interaction with security are 
statistically significant for symbolic patriotism. The coefficient for threat indicates the impact of 
threat when felt security is at zero. And the impact on patriotism is clearly sizeable. Threat 
produces a substantial increase in symbolic patriotism among insecure individuals but has a 
much more modest positive effect on patriotism among the most secure. Threat also enhances 
negative Arab stereotypes but its interaction with security is not significant. The absence of a 
significant interaction between threat and security means that perceived threat promotes negative 
stereotypes of Arabs regardless of felt security. Overall, it appears that insecure individuals 
respond to the threat of terrorism with enhanced ingroup attachment as reflected in higher levels 
of reported patriotism. But outgroup derogation is driven simply by threat. These findings 
highlight the importance of patriotism and ingroup attachments as a way to restore a sense of 
security in the face of threat. In contrast, outgroup derogation may simply reflect the vilification 
of a threatening outgroup that has little to do with a sense of personal security. Overall, these 
findings are partially consistent with the predictions of a combined version of attachment and 
terror management theory.  
  **INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE ** 
Domestic Security Policies 
 We now turn to an examination of the effects of threat on support for domestic security 
policies. The survey included two specific proposals to limit general civil liberties in order to 
reduce the threat of terror: requiring national identity cards and allowing the government to 
monitor personal phone calls and emails of ordinary Americans. We also asked respondents if 
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they were more concerned that the country would fail to enact strong anti-terrorism laws or if 
they were more worried that new laws would restrict civil liberties.  
 Three additional questions focused on activities designed to monitor and restrict the 
activities of people who might be considered threatening. Question included whether Arabs and 
Arab-Americans in the U.S. should be put under special surveillance, support for greater 
restrictions on visas for foreign students and other visitors to the U.S., and whether Arabs should 
undergo more intensive security checks than visitors from other countries.  Probit estimates for 
the first three domestic security measures are shown in Table 5 and estimates for the second set 
of security restrictions are presented in Table 6. In all equations we include as predictors national 
threat, security, and the interaction between threat and security, along with demographic 
controls. 
 The results in Table 5 show that increasing perceptions of threat predict greater support 
for both domestic security measures and lesser concern with civil liberties. With the inclusion of 
an interaction term between threat and security, the coefficient for perceived threat yields its 
effect when security is 0. In all three equations there are large, significant effects of threat when 
security is low, indicating that perceived threat has a sizeable influence on policy support among 
the least secure. In two of the three equations the interaction term is also substantively large, 
significant at the .05 level with a one-tailed test, and in the predicted direction.  The significant 
interaction terms indicate that threat is less likely to promote support for a national identity card 
and is less likely to increase concerns about a failure to enact strong anti-terrorism laws among 
the most secure. In both instances, the effect of threat on support for domestic security policies 
decreases as security increases. The size of the interaction term indicates that the effect of threat, 
while smaller for those high in security, does not fully decline to 0. There is no interaction 
between security and threat for monitoring phones and emails, however. The estimates for that 
equation indicate that the effect of threat is not reduced by felt security.  
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  **INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE ** 
 Among the other independent variables, the most consistent predictors of support for 
internal security measures are political orientations: conservatives and Republicans are more 
likely to support these policies than liberals and Democrats, and authoritarianism is associated 
with greater support. In addition, support for these policies decreases somewhat as education 
increases.  
 The three policies just examined involve security measures that would directly impact 
most Americans. The second set of policies assess support for more targeted “threats” to security 
by focusing on Arabs and other foreign visitors to the U.S. The estimates for these equations, 
shown in Table 7, are broadly similar to those just discussed, with some significant differences. 
Notice first that, for all three equations, the interaction between personal threat and security is in 
the predicted direction, significant at the .05 level in a one-tailed test, and substantively large. As 
before, when security is at its lowest value, the effect of personal threat on support for security 
policies is large. In two of these cases, surveillance and stricter security checks, the interaction 
between personal threat and felt security is sufficiently large that personal threat has no impact 
among those who feel completely secure. Thus, security reduces the effects of threat on support 
for these targeted policies than for more general domestic surveillance policies. 
  **INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE ** 
 As an illustration of the magnitude of threat effects we present predicted probabilities at 
differing levels of threat and security for two of the domestic security policies – the national ID 
card and special surveillance for Arabs and Arab-Americans. Predicted probabilities are 
calculated for white males who score at the midpoint on all other independent variables in Tables 
6 and 7.  Among those scoring at the lowest value of felt security, under 20% are predicted to 
support national ID cards at the lowest level of perceived threat; this goes up to almost 80% 
among those who see maximum threat. This is a massive difference. The effects of threat are 
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more muted among those high in security, ranging from a predicted low of  38% when threat is 
low to a 64% when it is high. A similar trend is observed on support for increased surveillance of 
Arabs and Arab Americans. Among those low in security, predicted support for increased 
surveillance goes from a low of 9% to a high of 58% as threat ranges from its lowest to highest 
value. Among those high in security, predicted support for surveillance varies less dramatically 
with level of threat ranging from 26% to 37%.  It is also clear that there those with a high sense 
of felt security who see little terrorist threat are more supportive of security policies than their 
less secure counterparts, a somewhat puzzling finding that requires further investigation.  
Threat and Support for Military Action 
We also examined the impact of threat and security on support for overseas military 
action in response to the events of 9/11. Three questions tapped support for the military 
intervention in Afghanistan and more generally asking whether “the level of US military action 
in response to the terrorist attacks” was sufficient, whether the strength of support for  
“increasing the level of military action even if it means that U.S. armed forces might suffer a 
substantial number of casualties”, and whether “the US should limit its military action to Osama 
bin Laden and the Taliban or should it broaden its action to include other countries that harbor 
and support terrorists.” Ordered probit analyses were conducted to assess the determinants of 
support for each one of these questions; findings are reported in Table 8.  
Previous analyses of these data provide evidence that threat has a substantial, positive 
impact on support for overseas military action (Huddy et al 2005). This finding is confirmed in 
the current analysis but is further qualified by evidence of a sizeable interaction between threat 
and security.  As seen in Table 8, threat has substantial impact on all three indicators of support 
for military action when security is at its lowest level, as indicated by the coefficient for threat in 
Table 7. In addition, the interaction between threat and security is sizeable and significant for 
level of military action and a desire to expand action beyond Osama bin Laden and the Taliban. 
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In both instances, the effects of threat on support for military action are greatly reduced among 
the most secure. There is also a sizeable but non-significant interaction between threat and 
security that almost halves the impact of threat on support for increased military action even with 
casualties among the most secure.  
 As for domestic policy, felt security has a sizeable moderating influence on the degree to 
which threat increases support for national security policy. Based on the analyses presented in 
Table 8, we calculated the predicted probability that respondents rated the U.S. level of military 
action in response to 911 as “too little”. Among those who felt insecure, roughly 6% who 
perceived little threat thought the response had been inadequate compared to 54% of those who 
perceived maximum future threat to the U.S. In contrast threat had a much reduced effect on 
policy support among those who felt the most secure. Fifteen percent of the most secure who 
perceived little terrorist threat thought the U.S. response had been inadequate compared to 27% 
of those who perceived the U.S. as facing the highest level of threat, a far more muted difference. 
Felt security clearly moderates the influence of threat on American support for overseas military 
action.  
  **INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE ** 
Finally, a number of other factors influenced support for an aggressive foreign policy. 
Men, non-blacks, Republicans, conservatives, and authoritarians were generally more supportive 
of overseas military intervention than others, as seen in Table 8.   
 
Conclusion 
Not everyone responds to the threat of terrorism in the same way. In this study, we have 
highlighted the powerful moderating influence of felt security on the extent to which perceived 
threat leads to support for restrictive domestic security policy and aggressive international action.  
We have shown in past research that feelings of national threat promote support for an 
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aggressive foreign policy (Huddy et al 2005). The current findings temper that conclusion by 
demonstrating that the greatest impact of threat is concentrated among individuals who had 
difficulty maintaining a sense of security in the months following the terrorist attacks of 911. We 
also highlight the powerful influence of security and threat on support for domestic national 
security policies that potentially curtail American civil liberties. For both domestic and 
international security policy, feeling insecure can profoundly influence whether or not 
individuals seek a sense of personal security in government policy.  
Our research not only sheds light on reactions to the events of 9/11, but also provides an 
important extension to existing research on tolerance and civil liberties by demonstrating the 
powerful and distinct effects of threat. Past tolerance studies have typically found a strong desire 
to curtail the rights and liberties of members of groups that pose a broad societal threat (Marcus 
et al 1995; Sullivan et al. 1982). But researchers have paid much less attention to the willingness 
of study participants to forego their own liberties and freedoms. Findings from the current study 
suggest that this depends centrally on the combined experience of threat and insecurity. In our 
data, a sense of personal insecurity plays a central role in a willingness to forfeit personal 
liberties in response to an external threat, suggesting new avenues for research on political 
tolerance.  
Drawing on psychological attachment theory, we suggest that feelings of security are a long 
standing individual characteristic that may derive from early childhood attachment experiences. 
Attachment theory indicates that most adults achieve a secure attachment and this, in turn, 
improves their ability to deal with stress through imagined or real proximity to attachment 
figures. But more is needed to establish the links between felt security as measured in a survey 
context and more standard measures of attachment, in order to verify that felt security has many 
of the same properties. We uncover suggestive evidence consistent with attachment theory that 
felt security was not greatly affected by the terrorist attacks of 911, and was much less affected 
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than other reactions such as anxiety or depression. Felt security helped to minimize feelings of 
anxiety, promoted a sense of trust in other Americans, and mitigated the need to elevate feelings 
of symbolic patriotism as a way to cope with threat. When taken together, these findings suggest 
that felt security plays a central role in how people cope with stressful events and whether or not 
such events are translated into a desire for protective government policies.  
But more information is needed on a sense of felt security to ensure that it fully conforms to 
the expectations of attachment theory. How well does a sense of felt security correlate with other 
more standard measures of attachment style within romantic relationships? What evidence is 
there that a sense of felt security is stable over time, and relatively immune to the impact of 
ongoing events? And is there evidence that the impact of felt security can be observed in 
response to other government policies designed to handle frightening events such as avian flu or 
food contamination? Further research into felt security will help to determine the kinds of 
individuals most likely to support aggressive government action to deal with threatening events.
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Table 1 
 
Frequency Distributions of Threat and Security Items 
 
 
Threat:  
 
Very 
Concerned
Somewhat
Concerned
Not Very 
Concerned
Not At All 
Concerned DK/NA  
 How concerned are you that there will 
 be another terrorist attack on U.S. soil 
 in the near future? 
 
49.8% 36.5 9.7 3.5 0.4 
       
       How concerned are you that terrorists 
 will attack the U.S. with biological or 
 chemical weapons? 
 
47.3% 37.4 10.2 3.8 1.3 
       
      
 30.8% 37.1 19.8 11.2 1.2 
 How concerned are you personally 
 about you yourself, a friend, or a 
 relative being the victim of a future 
 terrorist attack in the United States? 
 
     
       
  
 
A Great 
Deal Some A Little Not At All DK/NA  
 How much, if any, have the terrorist 
 attacks shaken your own sense of 
 personal safety and security? 
 
17.8% 34.2 23.4 23.8 0.9 
       
       
Security:       
  As you think about the terrorist 
 attacks and the U.S. response, how 
 often have you felt… 
 Very 
Often Sometimes
Not Very 
Often Never DK/NA 
       
     Secure?  45.0% 36.2 10.8 6.4 1.7 
       
     Confident?  46.4% 35.6 9.5 5.6 2.9 
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Figure 1 
 
Kernel Density Plots for Anxiety and Security 
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Table 2 
Determinants of Anxiety, Depression, and Security 
 
  
Anxiety
  
Depression
  
Security
         
  Know Someone Killed .07 
(.02) 
.04 
(.01)
 .06 
(.01)
.04 
(.01)
 -.01 
(.02) 
.00 
(.02)
  Live in Northeast .05 
(.02) 
.01 
(.02)
 .06 
(.02)
.03 
(.02)
 -.02 
(.02) 
-.01 
(.02)
  Threat  .61 
(.02)
  .45 
(.02)
  -.14 
(.03)
  Age -.013 
(.004)
-.014 
(.003)
 .006 
(.004)
.006 
(.004)
 .008 
(.004) 
.008 
(.004)
  Education -.014 
(.003)
-.006 
(.002)
 -.016 
(.003)
-.011 
(.002)
 .002 
(.003) 
.000 
(.003)
  Gender (female) .18 
(.01) 
.12 
(.01)
 .06 
(.01)
.02 
(.01)
 -.09 
(.01) 
-.07 
(.01)
    Black -.00 
(.03) 
-.05 
(.02)
 .08 
(.02)
.05 
(.02)
 -.06 
(.03) 
-.05 
(.03)
    Hispanic .04 
(.03) 
.00 
(.02)
 .11 
(.03)
.08 
(.02)
 .02 
(.03) 
.01 
(.02)
    Other .01 
(.03) 
-.01 
(.02)
 .05 
(.03)
.04 
(.03)
 -.02 
(.03) 
-.01 
(.03)
  Party ID (Republican) -.05 
(.02) 
-.03 
(.02)
 -.06 
(.02)
-.04 
(.02)
 .03 
(.02) 
.03 
(.02)
  Ideology (Conservative) .04 
(.02) 
.02 
(.02)
 .03 
(.02)
.02 
(.02)
 .02 
(.02) 
.02 
(.02)
  Authoritarianism .05 
(.02) 
-.02 
(.02)
 .08 
(.02)
.03 
(.02)
 -.02 
(.02) 
-.00 
(.02)
         
Constant .49 
(.05) 
.08 
(.04)
 .31 
(.05)
.01 
(.05)
 .72 
(.05) 
.81 
(.05)
         
N 1478 1478  1478 1478  1474 1474 
R2 .16 .42  .10 .26  .04 .06 
  
 
Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients 
in bold are at least two times the size of their standard errors. Variables are coded to range from 0 to 1 
except for age (in tens of years) and Education (in years). White is the excluded category for the 
race/ethnicity dummy variables. 
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Table 3 
 
Effects of Security on Trust  
 
 
  
Trust 
Americans 
  
Americans 
Helpful 
      
Threat -.18 (.19)  .36 (.21) 
Security .47 (.14)  .50 (.16) 
Anxiety -.35 (.17)  .09 (.20) 
      
Age .090 (.022)  .136 (.026) 
Education .054 (.016)  .068 (.018) 
Gender (female) -.12 (.07)  .04 (.08) 
   Black -.63 (.14)  -.31 (.14) 
   Hispanic -.30  (.15)  -.17 (.16) 
   Other -.02 (.17)  -.12 (.18) 
Party ID (Republican) .14 (.12)  .09 (.13) 
Ideology (Conservative) -.16 (.12)  -.10 (.14) 
Authoritarianism -.58 (.12)  -.22 (.13) 
      
Threshold  .46 (.32)  1.09 (.36) 
Constant      
N 1415   1396  
(Pseudo) R2 .09   .06  
 
 
Note: Entries are maximum likelihood probit coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. 
Coefficients in bold are at least twice the size of their standard error. Variables are coded to 
range from 0 to 1 except for age (in tens of years) and Education (in years). White is the 
excluded category for the race/ethnicity dummy variables.  
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Table 4 
 
Effects of Threat and Security on Anxiety and Depression 
 
  
 
Anxiety 
  
 
Depression 
      
Personal Threat .80 (.07)  .66 (.07) 
Security .09 (.06)  .08 (.06) 
Threat x Security -.25 (.08)  -.29 (.09) 
      
Age -.015 (.003)  .006 (.004) 
Education -.005 (.002)  -.010 (.002) 
Gender (female) .11 (.01)  .00 (.01) 
   Black -.05 (.02)  .04  (.02) 
   Hispanic -.01 (.02)  .08 (.02) 
   Other -.01 (.02)  .04 (.03) 
Party ID (Republican) -.02 (.02)  -.03 (.02) 
Ideology (Conservative) .02 (.02)  .02 (.02) 
Authoritarianism -.02 (.02)  .03 (.02) 
      
Constant .00 (.05)  -.04 (.06) 
N 1473   1472  
(Pseudo) R2 .42   .27  
 
 
 
Note:  Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.  
Coefficients in bold are at least twice the size of their standard error. Variables are coded to 
range from 0 to 1 except for age (in tens of years) and Education (in years). White is the 
excluded category for the race/ethnicity dummy variables. 
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Table 5 
 
Effects of Threat and Security on Symbolic Patriotism and Negative Arab Stereotypes 
 
 
  
Symbolic 
Patriotism  
  
Negative Arab 
Stereotypes 
      
Threat .41 (.07)  .25 (.09) 
Security .29 (.06)  .01 (.07) 
Threat x Security -.32 (.09)  -.11 (.10) 
      
Anxiety -.01 (.03)  -.03 (.03) 
Age .001 (.003)  .005 (.004) 
Education -.003 (.002)  -.011 (.003) 
Gender (female) .00 (.01)  .02 (.01) 
   Black -.09  (.02)  .01  (.02) 
   Hispanic -.06 (.02)  .08 (.03) 
   Other -.06 (.02)  -.03 (.03) 
Party ID (Republican) .04 (.02)  .03 (.02) 
Ideology (Conservative) .08 (.02)  .05 (.02) 
Authoritarianism .07 (.02)  .11 (.02) 
      
Constant .43 (.05)  .36 (.08) 
N 1423   1224  
R2 .13   .13  
 
 
Note:  Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.  
Coefficients in bold are at least twice the size of their standard error. Variables are coded to 
range from 0 to 1 except for age (in tens of years) and Education (in years). White is the 
excluded category for the race/ethnicity dummy variables. 
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Table 6 
 
Determinants of Civil Liberty Preferences 
 
 
 Support  
National ID 
Card 
 Monitor 
Phones and 
Email 
 Anti-Terrorism 
Laws vs. Civil 
Liberties 
         
Threat 1.50 (.40)  .85 (.40)  1.82 (.54) 
Security .46 (.33)  .42  (.34)  1.14 (.46) 
Threat x Security -.85 (.47)  -.25 (.47)  -1.32 (.64) 
         
Anxiety .15 (.14)  .20 (.15)  -.03 (.18) 
Age .011 (.018)  .063 (.018)  .035 (.025) 
Education -.046 (.013)  -.035 (.013)  -.000 (.017) 
Gender (female) .04 (.06)  -.01 (.06)  .06 (.08) 
   Black -.17 (.12)  -.07 (.12)  -.20 (.15) 
   Hispanic .06 (.12)  .22 (.12)  -.23 (.16) 
   Other -.02 (.14)  .13 (.14)  .06 (.17) 
Party ID (Republican) -.04 (.10)  .21 (.10)  .46 (.12) 
Ideology (Conservative) .21 (.10)  .46 (.10)  .26 .13 
Authoritarianism .11 (.09)  .21 (.10)  .25 .12 
         
Threshold 1 -.11 (.35)  1.00 (.36)  2.23 (.48) 
Threshold 2 .43 (.35)  1.69 (.36)    
Threshold 3 1.24 (.35)  2.50 (.36)    
N 1431   1439   1200  
Pseudo R2 .03   .04   .05  
 
 
Note: Entries are maximum likelihood probit coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. 
Coefficients in bold are at least twice the size of their standard error. Variables are coded to 
range from 0 to 1 except for age (in tens of years) and Education (in years). White is the 
excluded category for the race/ethnicity dummy variables.  
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Table 7 
 
Determinants of Preferences on Policies Targeting Arabs 
 
 
 
  
Surveillance for 
Arabs and Arab 
Americans 
  
Toughen 
Restrictions on 
Visas 
 Stricter 
Security 
Checks for 
Arabs 
         
Threat 1.69 (.53)  2.25 (.57)  1.29 (.45) 
Security .83 (.44)  .66 (.44)  .24 (.29) 
Threat x Security  -1.38 (.62)  -1.47 (.68)  -.91 (.54) 
         
Anxiety .09 (.18)  -.31 (.21)  .21 (.17) 
Age .059 (.024)  .157 (.028)  .064 (.022) 
Education -.021 (.016)  .019 (.019)  -.021 (.015) 
Gender (female) -.21 (.08)  -.08 (.09)  -.26 (.08) 
   Black -.32 (.15)  -.47 (.15)  .05 (.13) 
   Hispanic -.34 (.16)  -.41 (.16)  .13 (.15) 
   Other -.44 (.21)  .00 (.20)  .05 (.16) 
Party ID (Republican) .24 (.12)  .19 (.14)  .00 (.11) 
Ideology (Conservative) .36 (.13)  .51 (.15)  .41 (.12) 
Authoritarianism .39 (.12)  .29 (.14)  .26 (.11) 
         
Threshold 1 2.05 (.46)  1.46 (.48)  1.00 (.40) 
N 1334   1419   1429  
Pseudo R2 .07   .11   .05  
 
 
Note: Entries are maximum likelihood probit coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. 
Coefficients in bold are at least twice the size of their standard error. Variables are coded to 
range from 0 to 1 except for age (in tens of years) and Education (in years). White is the 
excluded category for the race/ethnicity dummy variables.  
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Table 8  
 
Determinants of Support for Military Action 
 
 
  
 
Level of 
Military Action 
  
Support 
Greater 
Military Action 
 Expand 
Military Action 
Against 
Terrorism 
         
Threat 1.70 (.44)  1.13 (.41)  2.70 (.59) 
Security .56 (.36)  .68 (.34)  1.49 (.47) 
Threat x Security  -1.29 (.52)  -.52 (.49)  -2.24 (.71) 
         
Anxiety -.25 (.17)  -.42 (.15)  -.55 (.21) 
Age -.040 (.021)  .021 (.020)  -.021 (.028) 
Education -.008 (.015)  -.008 (.014)  .011 (.019) 
Gender (female) -.25 (.07)  -.36 (.07)  -.30 (.09) 
   Black -.38 (.13)  -.50 (.12)  -.44 (.15) 
   Hispanic -.20 (.14)  -.43 (.13)  -.40 (.17) 
   Other .01 (.16)  -.26 (.14)  -.24 (.19) 
Party ID (Republican) .17 (.11)  .62 (.10)  .57 (.14) 
Ideology (Conservative) .32 (.12)  .30 (.11)  .02 (.15) 
Authoritarianism .30 (.11)  .24 (.11)  .27 (.14) 
         
Threshold 1 -.80 (.39)  -.04 (.36)  .75 (.51) 
Threshold 2 1.65 (.39)  .52 (.36)    
Threshold 3    1.64 (.37)    
N 1381   1309   1369  
Pseudo R2 .05   .07   .08  
 
 
Note: Entries are maximum likelihood probit coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. 
Coefficients in bold are at least twice the size of their standard error. Variables are coded to 
range from 0 to 1 except for age (in tens of years) and Education (in years). White is the 
excluded category for the race/ethnicity dummy variables.  
 
 
